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Abstract: This paper provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the relation between 
the cyclicality of fiscal expenditure policy, output volatility, and economic growth, using a 
large cross-section of 88 countries over the period 1960 to 2004. Identification of the effects 
of (endogenous) cyclical expenditure policy is achieved by exploiting the exogeneity of 
countries‟ political and institutional characteristics, which we find to be relevant determinants 
of the cyclicality of expenditures. There are three main results: First, both pro- and 
countercyclical expenditure policy amplify output volatility, much in a way like pure fiscal 
shocks that are unrelated to the cycle. Second, output volatility, due to variations in cyclical 
and discretionary fiscal policy, is negatively associated with economic growth. Third, there is 
no direct effect of cyclicality on economic growth other than through output volatility. These 
findings advocate the introduction of fiscal rules that limit the use of (discretionary and) 
cyclical fiscal (expenditure) policy to improve growth performance by reducing volatility.  
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I. Introduction 
Does fiscal policy affect economic growth? This is clearly one of the most fundamental and 
policy relevant macroeconomic questions. Easterly (2005) argues that there is no robust 
evidence for a relation between macroeconomic policies (including fiscal policy) and 
economic growth, once institutions are controlled for. A similar point is made by Acemoglu et 
al. (2003). Yet this is not the predominant view. As Caballero (2008, p. 1) states more 
representatively: “Good macroeconomic policy helps growth ... I do not think this view is in 
any dispute in the applied and policy world.” 
 
Notwithstanding the wide agreement that macroeconomic policies can influence 
economic performance, it remains a challenge for both theory and empirics to identify the 
channels through which economic policy affects growth. The emergence of new endogenous 
growth theory, overcoming the traditional dichotomy between business cycle theory on the 
one hand and growth theory on the other hand, has laid the ground for such an analysis. It is 
hardly questioned that economic policy affects economic activity in the short run. But then, if 
business cycle volatility and economic growth are related as suggested by endogenous growth 
theory, economic policy can indirectly affect growth through its effect on the (volatility of 
the) business cycle. Such a finding would also lead to a reassessment of macroeconomic 
priorities: The welfare cost of volatility per se are widely regarded as negligible since Lucas 
(1987). But if volatility turns out to have a negative effect on economic growth, its costs – or 
equivalently, the gains from stabilization – will be substantial (Barlevy, 2004). 
 
Regarding the role of fiscal policy, Fatas and Mihov (2003) suggest introducing fiscal 
rules as a means to reduce the use of discretionary fiscal policy, defined as fiscal policy 
unrelated to the business cycle, based on their finding for a large cross-section of 91 countries 
that aggressive use of discretionary policy lowers growth by increasing output volatility.  
 
This paper highlights the role of another important element of fiscal policy, namely 
cyclical fiscal policy. So far, there are hardly studies investigating the effects of fiscal 
cyclicality on economic growth. One notable exception is Aghion and Marinescu (2008), who 
consider an (unbalanced) panel of annual data for 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 2007. 
Regressing growth on alternative cyclicality measures (and standard controls for economic 
growth regressions), they find a positive effect of the „countercyclicality‟ of fiscal policy on 
economic growth. The policy relevance of such a finding is obvious. In fact, Aghion and 
Howitt (2006) argue that the lower degree of countercyclicality in European Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries is one of the reasons for their poor growth performance relative to the UK or 
the USA in the 1990s.  
The main goal of the present paper is to shed more light on the role of cyclical fiscal 
policy and its transmission channels, considering both its effect on output volatility, and – in a 
second step – its effect on economic growth. We also test whether cyclicality affects growth 
„directly‟ apart from its indirect effect through output volatility. Other than previous studies 
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we consider a large cross-section of 88 countries covering the period 1960 to 2004, which is 
motivated by the use of (de facto) time-invariant variables on the countries‟ political and 
institutional characteristics to identify the causal effect of (endogenous) cyclicality on output 
volatility.  
 
There is growing evidence that economic policy is shaped to a considerable extent by 
the characteristics of political and electoral systems (Person and Tabellini, 2000). The use of 
institutional variables as instruments for fiscal policy was first suggested by Fatas and Mihov 
(2003) in their study of the effects of discretionary fiscal policy, defined as fiscal policy 
unrelated to the business cycle, on volatility and economic growth. The present study is 
closely related to their approach but goes beyond the previous literature by considering the 
role of cyclical fiscal policy (as well as discretionary fiscal policy). We demonstrate that 
institutional variables (such as political of constraints and the average number of elections) 
provide considerable information on the variation in fiscal cyclicality across countries, and we 
use this exogenous variation to identify the causal effect of cyclicality on output volatility and 
economic growth. We also suggest a new instrument for output volatility, which is based on 
volatility spillovers from other countries and thus entirely unrelated to a particular country‟s 
institutions or policies, in order to explore the robustness of the link between volatility and 
economic growth.  
 
We find that cyclical fiscal (expenditure) policy has a destabilizing effect on the 
economy, no matter whether it is pro- or countercyclical. In fact, it amplifies output volatility 
much the same way as discretionary fiscal policy. This adds to the widespread scepticism 
against the usefulness of fiscal policy as a fine-tuning instrument. We also find that output 
volatility, induced by variations in cyclical or fiscal policy, negatively affects economic 
growth. Taken together this has an important policy implication: Economic growth could be 
enhanced by introducing fiscal rules, designed to restrict both the use of discretionary fiscal 
policy (Fatas and Mihov, 2003) as well as the use of cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II constructs measures of 
fiscal cyclicality and the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy for a large cross-section 
of 88 countries. Section III motivates the identification strategy and provides evidence on the 
relation between cyclical (and discretionary) fiscal policy and output volatility. Section IV 
considers the effect of cyclicality on economic growth. Section V summarizes the results and 
concludes.  
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II. Constructing Measures of Cyclical and Discretionary Fiscal Policy  
Changes in a government‟s fiscal stance can be decomposed into three components (Gali and 
Perotti, 2003): i) automatic fiscal responses under the set of existing fiscal rules and 
institutions, i.e., that part of fiscal policy driven by forces which are largely outside the 
control of fiscal authorities (at least in the short-run);  ii) fiscal policy in response to the 
business cycle (henceforth „cyclical fiscal policy‟); and iii) fiscal policy unrelated to the 
business cycle (henceforth „discretionary fiscal policy‟). Although cyclical policy (ii) is also 
part of discretionary fiscal policy in a broader sense, we reserve the term „discretionary‟ 
exclusively to denote policy unrelated to the cycle throughout this paper.  
 
We use government consumption as indicator of fiscal policy. This choice is dictated by 
data availability, since there are no internationally comparable data for other measures of 
fiscal policy for our large cross-section of countries. On the one hand, this limits the 
generality of our results. On the other hand, an advantage is that government expenditures – 
compared with revenues – are less responsive to the cycle through stabilizers „built-in‟ the 
fiscal system and can be changed with relative ease. As a consequence, expenditures are more 
indicative of a government‟s intentional cyclical policy than revenues, whose cyclical 
behaviour is driven by automatic stabilizers to a much larger extent. And while government 
consumption is only a subset of total expenditures, results of previous studies suggest that the 
cyclicality of government consumption reflects the cyclicality of overall government 
expenditures reasonably well.
1
 
 
We follow the standard approach in the literature and estimate cyclicality parameters () 
by regressing growth of real government consumption (G) on the growth of real GDP (Y), 
correcting for serial correlation in the error term: 
 
 titiiiti YG ,,, lnln   , (1a) 
 titiiti ,1,,    . (1b) 
 
Equation (1) is estimated separately for each of the i = 1, …, 88 countries, which is the largest 
set of countries for which the key variables required in the present study are available. The 
time dimension t ranges from 1960 to 2004; for some countries, a slightly shorter time span 
had to be used. Appendix A1 provides a detailed description of the sample and data used.  
 
Equation (1) should be regarded as reduced form equation for government consumption. 
As Lane (2003) points out there is no reason to control for simultaneous feedback from 
government spending to GDP. Hence, we estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares. As 
                                                 
1
 In Lane (2003), for example, who studies the determinants of cyclical fiscal policy using a sample of 
22 OECD countries, the correlation between the cyclicality of government consumption and that of 
total government expenditures is 0.71.  
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a result we obtain a decomposition of the growth of government consumption into a cyclical 
and a discretionary component. The time series of country i‟s cyclical fiscal policy is given 
by tii Y ,lnˆ  ; and the estimate of the (structural) residual of equation (1), i.e., ti ,ˆ , is 
interpreted as series of discretionary fiscal policy shocks. By least squares algebra these two 
series are orthogonal.  
 
As will be outlined more in detail below, the approach pursued here is to identify the 
effects of cyclical fiscal policy on volatility and growth using the cross-country variation in 
the data and exploiting the exogeneity of (de facto) time-invariant measures of political and 
institutional characteristics. Hence, we require country-specific indicators of the average 
cyclicality of fiscal policy over the time period considered. That is exactly what the estimates 
of the parameter i measure, a positive (negative) value being associated with procyclical 
(countercyclical) fiscal behaviour. Our results indicate substantial cross-country variation in 
the cyclicality parameters, whose estimates range from –0.835 to 2.698. Most of the countries 
show procyclical fiscal expenditure policy; only 11 of the 88 coefficients are negative. The 
country-specific cyclicality coefficients ti,ˆ are reported in Appendix A1. 
 
Regarding discretionary fiscal policy, Fatas and Mihov (2003) interpret the volatility of 
the error term ( ti , ) in an equation similar to (1) over a certain time period as an indicator of a 
government‟s aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy. In line with this reasoning, we 
define our empirical measure of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR) as standard deviation of 
the residuals from equation (1), i.e., )ˆ(sd iiDISCR  . The country-specific estimates of 
DISCR are reported in Appendix A1. 
 
Regarding the relevance of cyclical versus discretionary fiscal policy, the R
2
 in equation 
(1), averaged over all 88 countries, amounts to 0.201. This means that roughly one-fifth of the 
total variation in fiscal policy is due to cyclical fiscal policy. This is a non-negligible portion, 
bearing in mind that the overall variation in government consumption will also partly reflect 
measurement errors.  
 
Our estimates are well in line with previous studies. Comparing our cyclicality 
coefficients iˆ  (for period 1960 to 2004) with those of Lane (2003) for 22 OECD countries 
(for 1960 to 1998), the correlation is 0.872. Our measure of discretionary fiscal policy is very 
close to that of Fatas and Mihov (for 1960 to 2000): The correlation of their levels (logs) is 
0.887 (0.945). We conclude that the simple approach given by equation (1) yields reliable 
estimates of the cross-country variation in discretionary and cyclical fiscal policy, which are 
comparable with previous studies of fiscal policy.  
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III. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy and Output Volatility 
1. The Empirical Model  
Our basic empirical framework is closely related to that of Fatas and Mihov (2003); the novel 
feature is that the cyclicality of fiscal policy is included as explanatory variable for output 
volatility: 
 
iii
y
i uCYC  γxlnln 10  .  (2a) 
 
The dependent variable is output volatility ( y), defined as standard deviation of the growth 
rate of (real) output per capita; CYC is our measure of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, which 
we construct from the estimates of equation (1) as will be outlined more in detail below; xi is 
a vector of control variables, and u is a stochastic error term. The cross-section dimension (i) 
comprises 88 countries, the largest sample for which the required data are available. Unless 
mentioned otherwise, all data are averages over the period 1960 to 2004. (See Appendix A1 
for a more detailed description of the sample and the data.) 
 
As it is standard in skedastic regressions, we choose a logarithmic specification to avoid 
negative predicted values for the standard deviation of output growth. It is then natural to use 
the cyclicality measure in log form as well, such that the parameter of our main interest (1) 
measures the relative change of output volatility with respect to relative changes in 
cyclicality. While the logarithmic specification yields a slightly better fit, it is not crucial for 
the results, as we show in the sensitivity analysis below.  
 
We define cyclicality (CYC) as absolute value of ˆ  to allow for negative values of the 
cyclicality coefficients iˆ in the logarithmic specification (2a). Obviously, the variable CYC 
= ˆ  then measures only the responsiveness of fiscal policy, but not its direction, i.e., whether 
it is pro- or countercyclical. This could be addressed by properly signing ln CYC for the 
respective observations. But this would impose the symmetry assumption that – if procyclical 
policy amplifies business cycles – countercyclical policy smoothes business cycles. This is an 
assumption we wish to test rather than impose right from the beginning in light of the 
widespread scepticism against the effectiveness of fiscal policy as fine-tuning instrument. 
Countercyclical fiscal policy might actually turn out destabilizing due to lags in (recognition, 
implementation, and) materialization, a point prominently made by Friedman (1953).  
 
Consequently, we do not impose any assumption about the relation between the effects 
of pro- and countercyclical policy right from the beginning. Instead, we define CYCi as 
absolute value of iˆ  ( iiCYC ˆ ) and allow for different parameters of ln CYCi, depending 
on whether iˆ  is positive or negative for the respective observation i:  
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iii
counter
i
counter
i
y
i uCYCDCYC  γxlnlnln 110  ,  (2b) 
 
where D
counter
 is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for „countercyclical observations‟, i.e., 
1counteriD  for all i where 0ˆ i  and 0 otherwise. The parameter 
counter
1 then measures the 
difference between the effect of countercyclical fiscal policy and the effect of procyclical 
fiscal policy on output volatility (1). 
 
We start from a simple regression of output volatility on cyclicality (CYC) and then add 
three further explanatory variables: Government size (GSIZE) is included to account for the 
potentially stabilizing role of larger governments (Gali, 1994). Openness (OPEN), measured 
as imports plus exports as a share of GDP, is a standard explanatory control for output 
volatility and fiscal policy according to Rodrik (1998). Finally, the level of development, 
measured as (log of) real GDP per capita (GDPPC) accounts for the fact that poor countries 
typically have more volatile business cycles and controls for the quality of institutions and 
economic policy. Hence, the vector xi = [GSIZEi, OPENi, lnGDPPCi]. Regarding government 
size, it has been argued that more volatile economies may have an incentive to set up larger 
governments as a means to reduce macroeconomic volatility (Rodrik, 1998). As a 
consequence, GSIZE might be endogenous in equation (2). In line with Fatas and Mihov 
(2003) we use the standard approach and instrument GSIZE by the (log of) population (POP), 
the urbanization rate (URBAN), and the dependency ratio (DEP).  
 
In a final step, we will include the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy as 
defined in section II (DISCR), yielding our most comprehensive model: 
 
iiii
y
i uDISCRCYC  γxlnlnln 210  . (3) 
 
Before turning to the estimation results for models (2) and (3), two issues warrant 
discussion. First, our variable of main interest, the cyclicality of fiscal policy (CYC), is 
endogenous with respect to output volatility as a result of reverse causality. From a theoretical 
perspective, Talvi and Vegh (2005) show in a political economy model that lobbying for 
higher public spending during a boom generates a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. A feature 
of this model is that the larger the incipient primary surplus (the larger the boom) the higher 
the spending pressures and the resulting political distortions. As a consequence high output 
volatility tends to generate procyclical fiscal behaviour.
2
 This would introduce an upward bias 
in the estimated effect of cyclicality on output volatility. In addition, it should be borne in 
mind that the cyclicality measure (CYC) is an estimate of its true value. As a result it might be 
subject to classical measurement error, causing an attenuation bias.  
                                                 
2
 Talvi and Vegh (2005) also provide evidence from a large cross-section of countries that the degree 
of procyclicality in government consumption is positively correlated with output volatility. Lane 
(2003) obtains a similar results for a sample of 22 OECD countries. 
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Another issue, related to the fact that our country-specific cyclicality measures (i) are 
generated by model (1), is that the observations on our variable CYCi are estimated with 
different precision. This is addressed by using a weighted (two stages) least squares 
procedure, using the inverse of the variance of iˆ  as weights.
3
 This implies that observations, 
for which the variable CYC is measured more precisely, are assigned a higher weight in the 
regression. As we show below the weighting improves the fit but it is not crucial for the 
results.  
 
2. Identification, First Stage Regressions, and Instrument Quality:  
Political and Institutional Characteristics as Determinants of Cyclicality  
In order to identify the causal effect of cyclicality on output volatility, we use variables on 
political and institutional characteristics as instruments. This choice is motivated by the 
growing theoretical literature and empirical evidence that economic policy is as shaped to a 
considerable extent by the characteristics of political and electoral systems (Person and 
Tabellini, 2000). At the same time, institutions can be reasonably assumed to be exogenous 
with respect to output volatility. Fatas and Mihov (2003) were the first to suggest using 
institutional variables as instruments for (discretionary) fiscal policy.  
 
We hypothesize and demonstrate that countries‟ political and institutional 
characteristics are not only relevant determinants of discretionary fiscal policy but also of 
cyclical fiscal policy. In particular, we consider four institutional variables: i) the average 
number of elections (NELEC) ii) a measure of political constraints (POLCON) by Henisz 
(2000), which captures the extent to which the executive faces political constraints to policy 
implementation;
4
 iii) a dummy for majoritarian systems (MAJ), and iv) a dummy for 
presidential regimes (PRES). 
 
Notice that the variable CYC, defined as absolute value of cyclicality (CYC = ˆ ), in 
the first place measures the aggressiveness (but not the direction) of cyclical fiscal policy. As 
a consequence, part of the discussion by Fatas and Mihov (2003) motivating the use of the 
institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) as instruments for the aggressiveness 
of discretionary policy directly carries over to our measure of cyclical fiscal policy (CYC).  
 
                                                 
3
 The choice of the weight is not affected by the logarithmic transformation. By the delta method, 
22
ln /1 CYCCYCCYC   , i.e. the variances of the level and log of CYC are equal up to a rescaling by 
the mean of CYC (CYC).   
4
 This (0,1)-index counts the number of veto points in the political system and the distribution of 
preferences across and within the different branches of the government. Power is more dispersed, the 
greater the number of veto points and the greater the division of control across different political 
parties (see Henisz (2000) for more details). 
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The extent of political constraints (POLCON) is the instrument with the strongest 
theoretical motivation. According to the „voracity hypothesis‟ (Tornell and Lane, 1998), 
power diffusion among more agents induces procyclicality, since fiscal competition by 
multiple power groups for fiscal revenues increases (decreases) in booms (recessions). On the 
other hand, governments less constrained in implementing their policy can respond more 
flexibly to the business cycle and will thus be better able to translate their „cyclicality 
preferences‟ into actual policy. What we observe is only the net outcome; this bottom line 
effect of POLCON is ambiguous and remains to be determined empirically.  
 
Regarding the electoral characteristics, there is a tradeoff between election-related and 
cyclical fiscal policy. The frequency and timing of elections (NELEC) and the induced 
electoral cycles will not be systematically related to the business cycle in general. As a 
consequence, the observed pattern of fiscal policy will show a smaller association with the 
(business) cycle, the larger the number of elections, i.e., the more the relation of fiscal policy 
to the business cycle is diluted by fiscal policy measures associated with the electoral cycle. A 
similar point can be made for MAJ in light of the argument by Persson and Tabellini (2001) 
that majoritarian systems will have more pronounced electoral cycles.  
 
Regarding the dummy for presidential regimes (PRES), it is less clear whether one 
would expect a relationship with cyclicality. It could be the case that presidential regimes will 
not only be associated with a more aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy as argued by 
Fatas and Mihov (2003), but also with a more active conduct of cyclical fiscal policy. 
 
While our choice of institutional variables as instruments for cyclicality is well 
motivated theoretically, the ultimate question is whether the variables NELEC, POLCON, 
MAJ, and PRES are also relevant instruments in our empirical model, i.e., whether they are 
informative about the variation in fiscal cyclicality in our sample of countries. Table 1 reports 
the results of a regression of the log of CYC on the four institutional variables separately 
(columns (1a) to (1d)) and simultaneously (column (2a)). The number of elections (NELEC) 
and political constraints (POLCON) turn out to have the strongest effect; they are significant 
both in a simple regression (columns (1a) and (1b)) of Table 1 and in a multiple regression on 
all four political variables (column (2a)). The sign of the coefficient of NELEC is negative as 
expected. The variable POLCON also enters with a negative sign; this does not necessarily 
reject the voracity hypothesis but suggests that – among the various ways through which 
political constraints affect the cyclicality of fiscal (expenditure) policy – the voracity effect 
does not appear to be the most dominant force.
5
 The variables MAJ and PRES are 
insignificant or only weakly significantly in a simple regression (columns (1c) and (1d)); in a 
multiple regression on all four institutional variables, both MAJ and PRES turn out 
                                                 
5
 Lane (2003) also finds little support for the voracity hypothesis in his study of the cyclicality of 
expenditures in a sample of 22 OECD countries; in particular, the effect of political constraints on 
cyclicality is often insignificant or shows the wrong sign.  
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insignificant with p-values of 0.854 and 0.789. Since the variables MAJ and PRES are 
uninformative about fiscal cyclicality, their inclusion in the first stage regression would only 
weaken the quality of our set of instruments (compare the F-statistic in columns (2a) and 
(2b)). Consequently, we will use only NELEC and POLCON as instruments for CYC in the 
two stages least squares regressions below.  
 
< Table 1 > 
 
Notice that column (2b) corresponds to the first stage regression for equation (2a) only 
in the most parsimonious specification without additional explanatory variables for output 
volatility. In the extended models, a more relevant issue is the partial correlation of NELEC 
and POLCON with CYC, controlling for the other explanatory variables (GSIZE, OPEN, and 
GDPPC). The first stage regression for the most comprehensive model including all controls 
– GSIZE (instrumented by POP, URBAN, and DEP), OPEN, and GDPPC – is given in 
column (3). An important result is that the variables NELEC and POLCON remain significant, 
both individually and jointly.  
 
Column (4) shows the corresponding first stage regression for discretionary fiscal policy 
(DISCR). Results are in line with Fatas and Mihov (2003). Notice that – in contrast to the first 
stage regression for CYC – the two variables MAJ and PRES turn out significant at the five 
and one percent level. At least from an empirical perspective, this suggest that the variation in 
the variables MAJ and PRES can help to identify the (separate) effect of discretionary policy 
in model (3), where both CYC and DISCR are included simultaneously.  
 
Overall, the results reveal interesting links between institutions and cyclicality. 
Exploring these links more in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purpose of the 
present study, the most relevant message from the results in Table 1 is that the two variables 
NELEC and POLCON are relevant instruments for cyclicality (CYC); this is not the case for 
the variables MAJ and PRES, which are, however, strongly associated with the aggressiveness 
of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR).   
 
3. Estimation Results  
We start from the most parsimonious specification of model (2), which includes only 
cyclicality (CYC) as explanatory variable.
6
 Columns (1a) and (1b) show the weighted least 
squares estimates (WLS) of equation (2a), which allows the effects of pro- and 
countercyclical fiscal policy to differ by including an interaction between CYC and a dummy 
for countercyclical policy (Dcounter). The estimated elasticity of output volatility with respect to 
procyclical fiscal policy is 0.184; the effect of countercyclical policy appears to be even larger 
                                                 
6
 The weighting accounts for the fact that CYC is a generated regressor, not for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in the error term in models (2) or (3) (which is also confirmed by standard tests). 
Hence, we use robust standard errors for inference throughout. 
 11 
(0.278), but the difference is insignificant with a p-value of 0.300. This conclusion holds up 
when the model is estimated by weighted two stages least squares (WTSLS), using the 
average number of elections (NELEC) and the index of political constraints (POLCON) as 
instruments for CYC (column (1b)). In that case the elasticities with respect to pro- and 
countercyclical fiscal policy are 0.595 and 0.501 respectively, but again the difference is 
insignificant (p-value: 0.618).
7
  
 
< Table 2 > 
 
In light of this result it appears to be justified to proceed with a restricted model, 
imposing parameter equality for pro- and countercyclical fiscal policy. Columns (2a) and (2b) 
show the WLS and WTSLS estimates of the simple regression of volatility on cyclicality. For 
comparison, columns (3a) and (3b) show the results of the unweighted LS and TSLS 
estimates. Notice first, that endogeneity of CYC is indeed pronounced: The difference 
between the (W)LS and (W)TSLS coefficients is sizeable. More formally, a Hausman test 
rejects that CYC is exogenous at the one percent level in all specifications. It is interesting to 
note that both the weighted and unweighted LS estimates of the effect of CYC on volatility 
show a strong attenuation bias towards zero. This suggests that measurement error is the 
dominant source of endogeneity rather than reverse causality (causing an upward bias). This 
view is also supported by a comparison of the weighted and unweighted estimates. In the 
weighted regressions, less precise estimates are assigned a lower weight, rendering the role of 
measurement error less relevant. As a consequence, the attenuation bias is less pronounced in 
the WLS regression, yielding coefficients that are closer to the WTSLS estimates.  
 
While we postpone a more comprehensive sensitivity analysis to below, we emphasize 
that the weighting is not crucial for the results: A comparison of columns (2b) and (3b) shows 
that the weighted and unweighted TSLS estimates are virtually identical, pointing to an 
elasticity of output volatility with respect to cyclicality of around 0.6. The choice of the 
logarithmic form of CYC is not essential for the qualitative conclusions as well: The 
corresponding results for the specification in levels (columns (4a) and (4b)) are in line with 
the logarithmic specification (columns (1b) and (2b)).  
 
A final observation is that the tests for overidentifying restrictions reject the null 
hypothesis of valid instruments in some specifications. This is not too surprising, given that 
several important variables have been omitted from the regression so far. Results for a more 
comprehensive model, including GSIZE, OPEN and GDPPC as controls are given in Table 3. 
As already discussed above, government size is likely to be endogenous with respect to 
                                                 
7
 We add that in a specification with two variables included, one for procyclical policy  
((1–Dcounter)CYC) and one for countercyclical policy (DcounterCYC), both coefficients are individually 
significant at the one percent level as well. Of course, the implied coefficients and the test for 
parameter equality are identical to the specification considered in column (1b) in Table 2. 
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volatility, which is addressed by using population (POP), the urbanization rate (URBAN), and 
the dependency ratio (DEP) as instruments for GSIZE.  
 
< Table 3 > 
 
Columns (1a) and (1b) show the unweighted LS and TSLS estimates, whereas column 
(1c) gives the results of the WTSLS estimation. As expected the estimated elasticity of 
volatility with respect to cyclicality becomes smaller in magnitude when the control variables 
are added (around 0.3) but remains significant. Exogeneity of CYC is still clearly rejected in 
all models; we thus focus on the (W)TSLS results. The OID tests are insignificant in most 
specifications, suggesting that the institutional variables NELEC and POLCON (as well as 
POP, DEP, URBAN) are valid instruments. To reinforce the finding of our parsimonious 
specification, we repeat the test for parameter equality between pro- and countercyclical 
policy (see columns (2a) and (2b)). The conclusion is the same as before: There is no 
evidence for a stabilizing effect of countercyclical fiscal policy. In contrast, it adds to output 
volatility, in a way not significantly different from that of procyclical fiscal policy.  
 
Of course, the results regarding the role of countercyclical policy should be interpreted 
with care. The number of countries which pursued countercyclical fiscal policy on average is 
rather small (11 out of the 88). While this might be too little variation to yield a significant 
difference in the estimated effect, it does not explain that the effect of countercyclical policy 
on volatility is always positive, a finding that is extremely robust. We also emphasize that our 
results should be interpreted as averages over countries and time. One cannot rule out that a 
highly effective government, which is aware of the relevant lag structures and able to respond 
very quickly, might be successful in its fiscal efforts to smooth business cycles. What our 
evidence suggest, however, is that such a constellation is rather the exception than the rule.  
 
Finally, we consider the results for model (3), which includes both cyclicality (CYC) 
and discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR). It is a subtle question, whether discretionary fiscal 
policy should be controlled for. On the one hand, discretionary fiscal policy is certainly a 
relevant determinant of output volatility (Fatas and Mihov (2003), Badinger (2008)). 
Moreover, while the time series of discretionary and cyclical fiscal policy measures for a 
single country are orthogonal, this does not carry over the cross-country variation in cyclical 
and discretionary policy (averaged over time): Countries that are more responsive to the cycle 
might also more actively engage in discretionary fiscal policy.  
 
Under these two assumptions – DISCR matters for volatility and is related to CYC – the 
estimated effect of CYC in model (2) will be upward biased due to the omission of DISCR. In 
that case, however, we would also expect the OID test to reject instrument validity, since the 
instruments used for CYC (i.e., POLCON, NELEC) are also related to discretionary policy  
(see section III, subsection 2). But this is not the case in any of the specifications, suggesting 
that these two elements of fiscal policy could be (close to) orthogonal in the cross-section. 
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 One could still argue that the OID test has small power and CYC and DISCR should be 
regarded as related for theoretical reasons. Even in that case the question remains, whether 
discretionary policy should be controlled for: A main reason for a possible association 
between DISCR and CYC is that an active conduct of cyclical fiscal policy might partly result 
in (unintentional) discretionary policy (unrelated to the cycle) as a result of lags in 
implementation and materialization (again, on average over countries and time). Since these 
unintentional consequences of cyclical fiscal policy can hardly be ruled out by policy makers 
in practice, it might be reasonable to let the parameter of cyclicality  in model (2) also capture 
its indirect effects on volatility through is relation to discretionary fiscal policy.  
 
Notwithstanding these arguments that might favour model (2) over model (3), we now 
turn to the results when DISCR is included (see column (3a)). As expected the coefficient of 
CYC becomes smaller, pointing to an elasticity of volatility with respect to cyclicality of 
around 0.163, but it remains significant at the 10 percent level. The elasticity with respect to 
discretionary fiscal policy is 0.454 but insignificant with a p-value of 0.103. This is not too 
surprising; since both variables are instrumented using mainly the same set of institutional 
variables (only MAJ and PRES are added as additional instruments for DISCR), the predicted 
values for CYC and DISCR from the first stage regressions will be strongly correlated, causing 
a multicollinearity problem in the second stage regression. This is aggravated by the presence 
of a third endogenous variable (GSIZE).
8
  
 
There are several ways to address this weak instruments problem: The most obvious 
would be to identify further instruments. Since it is difficult to think of variables affecting 
cyclicality (CYC) but not the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR) and vice 
versa, this approach does not appear to be very promising in the present context. 
Alternatively, an estimation technique more robust to weak instruments could be used. Stock 
and Yogo (2004), who consider the consequences of weak instruments and the performance 
of alternative estimators, find that limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) is far 
superior to TSLS estimation in the presence of weak instruments. Hence, we reestimate model 
(3) using LIML (see column (3b)): In that case CYC and DISCR turn both out significant with 
elasticities of 0.182 and 0.417 respectively.
 9
  
 
                                                 
8
 If government size is treated exogenous and population is included as instrument, CYC and DISCR 
turn out significant at the five and one percent level respectively. However, since there are strong 
theoretical arguments to regard government size as endogenous, and since the theoretical motivation 
for using country size (population) as instrument for CYC and DISCR is weak (despite the fact that is 
highly significant in the first stage regression), we pursue the more conservative approach here and 
treat GSIZE as endogenous.  
9
 Note that the superiority of LIML estimation in Stock and Yogo (2004) is obtained under 
homoscedasticity, which is also assumed in the LIML estimation here. 
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Another route would be to use a compound measure of discretionary and cyclical fiscal 
policy (ln CYC+ln DISCR), which could be justified in light of the fact that the hypothesis of 
parameter equality cannot be rejected (F-statistic: 0.704, p-value: 0.403). Results are given in 
column (4): In the restricted model, the compound measure of fiscal policy turns out highly 
significant with a coefficient of 0.238. The economic interpretation of this restricted model 
with equal parameters for cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy carries our finding regarding 
the irrelevance of the direction of cyclicality one step further: Not only has countercyclical 
policy the same effect on volatility as procyclical fiscal policy. It also implies that cyclical 
fiscal policy (CYC) has the same amplifying effect on output volatility as „random„ 
discretionary fiscal policy shocks, suggesting that the effects of intentional cyclical policy 
measures – due to poor timing and lags in implementation and materialization – spread over 
time in a way such that the implied average outcome is random with respect to the cycle.
10
 
Since the focus of the present paper is on cyclicality, however, we do not use a compound 
measure of fiscal policy in the following.  
 
4. Robustness  
We first demonstrate that the logarithmic transformation of CYC is not crucial for the results. 
Column (1a) in Table 4 uses the level of CYC and allows for parameter heterogeneity between 
pro- and countercyclical fiscal policy. As in the logarithmic specification, there is no evidence 
that countercyclical fiscal policy has a significantly different effect on volatility than 
procyclical fiscal policy. Column (1b) gives the results, when the parameters of pro- and 
countercyclical fiscal policy (in levels) are restricted to equality: CYC turns out significant at 
the 5 percent level with an average elasticity of 0.737. Judged by the standard error of 
estimation, the fit is worse than for the specification in log form. 
 
 < Table 4 > 
 
We next consider subsample stability of the results for models (2) and (3) with respect 
to the country dimension. A visual inspection of a scatter plot of output volatility against 
cyclicality does not suggest that our results are driven by a few extreme observations (see 
Figure 1). We nevertheless reestimate models (2) and (3), excluding countries with „large‟ 
output volatility or „large‟ cyclicality from the sample.
11
  
 
< Figure 1 > 
                                                 
10
This argument was already made by Friedman in his informal essay on fiscal policy: “In fiscal as in 
monetary policy, all political considerations aside, we simply do not know enough to be able to use 
deliberate changes in taxation and or expenditures as a sensitive stabilization mechanism. In the 
process of trying to do so, we almost surely make matters worse… by introducing a largely random 
disturbance that is simply added to other disturbances.“ (Friedman, 1962, p. 78).  
11
 For conservativeness, we focus on the TSLS results for model (3) here; the LIML coefficients are 
very similar and typically have smaller p-values.  
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Columns (2a) and (2b) give the results for models (2) and (3), excluding countries 
whose output volatility exceeds the sample average by more than one standard deviation. The 
same exercise is repeated in columns (3a) and (3b), excluding countries whose cyclicality 
coefficients exceed the sample average by more than one standard deviation. Overall, the 
results for the full sample in Table 2 hold up, confirming that our results are not driven by a 
few outlying observations.  
 
In columns (4a) and (4b) we focus on a subsample of 28 „rich‟ countries, constituting 
the upper third of the income distribution of our sample in terms of GDP per capita. In both 
models (2) and (3) the variable CYC becomes insignificant with p-values of 0.245 and 0.193, 
respectively. However, if the level of development (GDPPC) is excluded, which appears to be 
justifiable for a group of countries with a similar level of development (in particular in model 
(3) where GDPPC is insignificant), CYC becomes significant again in models (2) and (3) at 
the 10 and 5 percent level respectively. Moreover, if the level rather than the log of CYC is 
used, the variable CYC is close to significance with a p-value of 0.116 in model (2) (even with 
GDPPC included). (The qualitative results are essentially the same for the OECD subsample.) 
It goes without saying that these estimates, relying on asymptotic properties, should not be 
overstressed due to the small number of observations. Overall, our reading of these results is 
that in the group of highly developed countries, cyclical fiscal policy appears to have a 
significant though somewhat less pronounced destabilizing effect.  
 
In a final step we consider the results for the more recent period 1980 to 2004 to rule out 
that our estimates are driven by the comparably erratic times up the 1980s. We first note that 
our estimates of the cyclicality parameters (CYC) and the aggressiveness of discretionary 
fiscal policy (DISCR) for the full period from 1960 to 2004 and for the period of 1980 to 2004 
are fairly similar (see Appendix A1). Many of the countries that pursued countercyclical fiscal 
policy from 1960 to 2004 on average did so as well in the period from 1980 to 2004. The 
correlation between CYC (DISCR) for the two time periods is 0.766 (0.935). This also favours 
the interpretation that (de facto) time invariant institutional features of countries have a strong 
impact on the cross-country variation in the conduct of fiscal policy.  
 
Turning to the estimation results, a slight difference to the period 1960 to 2004 is that 
the effect of countercyclicality on volatility appears to be significantly different in magnitude 
from that of procyclical policy in the logarithmic specification (see column (5a)), though its 
effect on output volatility is still clearly positive. It is tempting to argue that countercyclical 
policy has become partly more effective (and thus overall less destabilizing). But this appears 
to be overstressing results a bit, given that there is no significant difference between the 
effects of pro- and countercyclical policy if the level rather than the log of CYC is used; 
column (5b) shows the (restricted) model using the level of CYC.  
 
The estimates of model (3) for the period 1980 to 2004 (columns (6a) and (6b)), where 
DISCR is included along with CYC, are in line with the results for the full period 1960 to 
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2000, in particular when the model is estimated using limited information maximum 
likelihood (column (6b)). As before the hypothesis of parameter equality of CYC and DISCR 
cannot be rejected.  
 
Finally, we add that the subsample stability with respect to the cross-country dimension 
for the period 1980 to 2004 (excluding countries with large volatility or large cyclicality, or 
considering rich countries only) is qualitatively very similar to that for the full period.  
 
 
IV. Fiscal Cyclicality, Volatility, and Economic Growth 
Having established a relationship between cyclicality and output volatility we now go on to 
assess the effect of cyclicality on economic growth through output volatility. From a 
theoretical perspective, the relation between output volatility and economic growth is 
ambiguous. A positive relation is conceivable as a result of a Schumpeterian cleansing effect 
of recessions (e.g., Caballero and Hammour, 1991) or due to the fact that the opportunity 
costs of productivity enhancing reorganizations are smaller during recessions (Hall, 1991). A 
negative relation might result from irreversibilities in investments or from credit market 
imperfections that constrain productivity enhancing investments in recession (Aghion et al. 
2006). The relation between volatility and growth is even more intricate, since causality may 
also run from growth to volatility (Stiglitz, 1993). Empirically, Ramey and Ramey (1995) 
found a negative effect of output volatility on economic growth, and – though there is no 
consensus so far – the evidence that has emerged since then tends to support this finding.  
 
While a number of studies have considered the effect of output volatility on growth, 
there is hardly evidence on the relation between the cyclicality of fiscal policy and growth. A 
noteable exception is Aghion and Marinescu (2008), who find a positive effect of 
countercyclicality measures in a growth regression, using an (unbalanced) panel of annual 
data for 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 2007. Moreover, no previous study has considered 
the relations between cyclicality, volatility and growth in a joint empirical framework.  
 
We first consider the effects of cyclicality on growth directly, running a cross-section 
regression of average growth of real GDP per worker over ( GDPPWln ) on the cyclicality 
of fiscal policy (CYC), again testing for differences in the effect of pro- and countercyclical 
policy:  
 
iii
counter
i
counter
ii CYCDCYCGDPPW   δw)ln(lnln 110  (4) 
 
The following standard controls (wi) are included in our cross-country growth regression: the 
(log of the) initial level of real GDP per worker (GDPPW
in
), the average level of human 
capital in terms of educational attainment, i.e., the fraction of males above 25 with primary 
schooling (HC
prim
) and secondary schooling (HC
sec
). Model (4) refers to the time period from 
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1960 to 2004 again; the cross-section dimension is slightly smaller now with 80 rather than 88 
countries due to missing human capital data.  
 
As in the volatility regressions in section III, the possible endogeneity of CYC is 
addressed by using the institutional variables NELEC and POLCON as instruments; and the 
fact that CYC is calculated from fitted values of model (1) is accounted for by a weighted least 
squares approach, using the inverse of the variance of CYC as weight.  
 
< Table 5 > 
 
Columns (1a) and (1b) in Table 5 report the unweighted LS and TSLS estimates, 
allowing the effect of pro- and countercyclicality to differ. Columns (2a) and (2b) report the 
respective weighted estimates. In all specifications we find a significantly negative effect of 
cyclicality on economic growth. And as in section II, only the magnitude of cyclicality seems 
to matter: We find a negative effect of both pro-and countercyclicality on economic growth, 
and while the coefficient of countercyclical fiscal policy is smaller in magnitude, the 
difference in the coefficients is not significantly different from zero. This holds true for both 
the unweighted and the weighted estimates. According to the Hausman test there is no strong 
evidence for endogeneity of CYC, though the (W)LS estimates of the parameter of CYC are 
always smaller in magnitude than the (W)TSLS estimates.  
 
The results in Table 5 suggest a negative relation between the cyclicality of fiscal policy 
and economic growth. In the corresponding model (4), which omits output volatility (and 
further controls), the parameter of CYC (1) captures all effects of cyclicality on economic 
growth, both through its relation with output volatility (direct and indirect through DISCR), 
through its relation with other variables affecting growth, as well as „direct‟ effects of 
cyclicality on economic growth (if any). From an economic policy perspective, this might in 
fact be the most relevant question.  
 
Nevertheless, we would like to provide a more detailed picture of the relation between 
cyclicality and growth. In particular, we also wish to answer the question whether CYC affects 
growth only through output volatility or also directly. Such a direct link could be motivated 
through the model by Aghion et al. (2006). Their argument is that credit constrained firms 
have a borrowing capacity that depends on current earnings, which are reduced in recessions, 
such that firms are less able to borrow in order to maintain growth enhancing investments. 
This reasoning suggests that countercyclicality may foster productivity growth by reducing 
the magnitude of the output loss induced by market failures (as credit market imperfections) 
in a recession. One could argue that such an effect should also hold for a given output 
volatility (i.e., controlling for output volatility). Regressing growth on cyclicality alone is not 
informative about the relevance of two potentially offsetting effects of cyclical fiscal policy: a 
negative effect by increasing volatility (suggested by the results in section III) and a possibly 
positive effect through reducing market failures due to credit market imperfections.  
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The empirical framework employed to address this question is sketched by Figure 2, 
which illustrates the interrelationships between the key variables in our empirical models. 
Potential endogeneity is indicated by reversed arrows (though the source of endogeneity is not 
necessarily simultaneity); relations between variables of the same equation (such as CYC and 
DISCR) are omitted for simplicity here.  
 
 < Figure 2 > 
 
To test for a direct effect of cyclicality on growth, we first consider a model relating 
growth to output volatility (and controls). In a next step we add cyclicality as additional 
regressor (again considering potentially different effects of pro- and countercyclical policy):  
 
ii
counter
i
counter
ii
y
i CYCDCYCGDPPW   )lnln(lnln 1110 φw  (5) 
 
Column (1a) in Table 6 reports the least squares estimates of equation (5), column (1b) 
the TSLS estimates using the full set of institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, 
PRES) as instruments for volatility.
12 
Notice that the exogeneity of output volatility ( y) is 
clearly rejected. Results of the TSLS estimates point to a negative effect of volatility on 
growth, consistent with our finding that cyclicality increases volatility (models (2) and (3)) 
and reduces growth (model (4)). The coefficient of output volatility (-2.968) suggests that an 
increase in volatility by one percent reduces average growth by some 0.3 percentage points. 
This is close to Fatas and Mihov (2003), who obtain a coefficient of -3.371 in a similar 
regression. We emphasize that results are very similar when MAJ and PRES are excluded 
from the set of instruments, or when CYC or DISCR are used as instruments directly. This is 
supportive of the finding in section III that the transmission mechanisms from political 
institutions to output volatility through cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy are very 
similar. 
  
< Table 6 >  
 
The OID tests, reported at the bottom of Table 6, suggest that there is nothing wrong 
with our instruments. However, one might still argue that the power of this test is low and that 
the instruments, which are based on the respective country‟s institutional characteristics might 
be somehow associated with other country-specific institutions or policies affecting economic 
growth. We thus propose a new instrument for output volatility (Z

), which is entirely 
unrelated to the respective country‟s characteristics. In particular, we suggest using, for each 
country i, the bilateral trade share weighted output volatility of all other countries j ( i) in the 
sample. In a world of highly interdependent economies, where local shocks are propagated 
through the international economic system through trade and financial flows, we expect 
                                                 
12
 Results for specifications without CYC are unweighted estimates. 
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„volatility spillovers‟ from foreign countries to be a relevant determinant of a country‟s own 
output volatility. However, in order to ensure exogeneity two modifications are made: First, 
the actual trade shares are replaced by predicted values from a bilateral gravity model 
including geographical variables only, an approach inspired by Frankel and Romer (1999). 
Second, the actual output volatility is replaced by predicted values from a regression of output 
volatility on (a constant and) the four institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES). 
Appendix A3 gives more details on the construction of this instrument, referred to as Z

 
henceforth. The validity of Z

 relies on the assumption that country i‟s geographical 
characteristics on the one hand and other countries‟ political institutions on the other hand are 
exogenous with respect to country i‟s economic growth in equation (4). In our view it is hard 
to think of convincing reasons why this assumption should be hurt. 
 
The variable Z

 also turns out to be a relevant instrument for output volatility besides 
the four institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES). In the first stage regression 
for model (5), including all four institutional variables, Z

 is significant at the one percent 
level. In fact, Z

 turns out to be the strongest instrument for output volatility besides political 
constraints (POLCON). This is an important result, since it implies that Z

 adds variation to 
identify the effect of output volatility in the growth regression (5) with CYC included as 
regressor, in addition to the identifying variation, which comes from the effects of institutions 
on volatility through on DISCR (which might be too closely associated with the effects of 
CYC on volatility) (see Figure 2). 
 
Column (1c) shows the TSLS estimates of model (4), using only Z

  as instrument; the 
estimated effect of volatility is even larger in magnitude, though the estimates are less precise. 
Nevertheless, output volatility remains significant with a p-value of 0.087. The fit of the 
model improves, when the four institutional variables are included as additional instruments 
(see column (1d)). Overall, the estimates of model (5) in columns (1b) to (1d), which differ 
only by the set of instruments used, are very similar. This is a reassuring result. In the 
following, we will use as instruments for volatility all four institutional variables (NELEC, 
POLCON, MAJ, PRES) as well as exogenous volatility spillovers (Z

) to provide additional 
identifying variation. 
 
We next consider the robustness of the results with respect to controlling for 
institutional quality, which we measure using the government antidiversion policy (GADP) 
index by Hall and Jones (1999). Since institutional quality might be endogenous as a result of 
reverse causality – rich countries are generally better able to build up (costly) high quality 
institutions – we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and use the following proxy variables for 
Western influence as instruments for GADP: distance from equator, the fraction of a country‟s 
population speaking English as mother tongue, and the fraction of a country‟s population 
speaking one of the five European languages (English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish) 
as mother tongue. The results in column (2) show that the coefficient of GADP is positive as 
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expected but insignificant. This might be due to inherently poor measurement of institutional 
quality and a mismatch in the time span covered by our growth regression (1960 to 2004) and 
the GADP measure, which refers to 1986 to 1995. Moreover, the effect of institutional quality 
on per capita income is probably better estimated using a level rather than a growth rate 
approach (see Hall and Jones (1999), Alcalá and Ciccone (2004)). The most important result 
in the present context is that output volatility remains significant and negatively related to 
economic growth, even if institutional quality in terms of GADP is controlled for.
13
  
 
We now test for a direct effect of cyclicality on growth. This means, that the variable 
CYC is included in the main equation (and instrumented by itself), whereas output volatility is 
instrumented by the institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) and exogenous 
volatility spillover (Z

). Columns (3a), (3b), and (3c) show the LS, TSLS, and WTSLS 
estimates of equation (5) including institutional quality as control.
14
 (Results are very similar 
if GADP is omitted.) The estimates show no evidence for a direct effect. We reestimate model 
(3), allowing the effect of pro- and countercyclical policy to differ. Again no evidence for a 
direct effect of cyclicality on growth can be identified (see column (4)). This is a very robust 
result and also holds up for the unweighted regression or if the model is estimates least 
squares. We also explored the subsample stability with respect to the cross-country dimension 
(rich countries, excluding countries with large volatility or cyclicality coefficients) and the 
time dimension, considering the more recent time span 1980 to 2004. In none of the 
specifications, we could identify a direct effect of cyclicality besides output volatility, 
irrespective of whether we allow the effect of countercyclical policy to differ from that of 
procyclical policy or not.
15
  
 
                                                 
13
 We also considered the variables OPEN or GSIZE as controls, since they are theoretically motivated 
determinants of output volatility and could be related to growth. This does not affect the results, 
which is not too surprising in light of the fact that the empirical association between volatility and 
these two variables is very weak (see the volatility regressions in section III). 
14
 Notice that, since CYC is included in the main model, the independent variation to identify the effect 
of volatility on growth comes from the instrument Z

 as well as from the effect of institutions on 
volatility through discretionary fiscal policy (see Figure 2). The latter is also apparent from the fact, 
that in a regression with output volatility as dependent variable, the political variables (MAJ, PRES, 
NELEC, POLCON) are jointly significant determinants of output volatility when CYC is controlled 
for, but they become insignificant if DISCR is added to the regressions as well. This suggests an 
alternative approach, using DISCR as instrument for  y directly (instead of the instead of the 
institutional variables); results turned out almost identical and are not shown here for brevity. 
15
 The robustness analysis for models (4) and (5) turns out very similar to that for output volatility in 
section II. Results for the effect of cyclicality on growth (Table 5) and volatility on growth (Tables 
6) generally hold up but are less pronounced in the sample of rich countries, where p-values are 
slightly above 10 percent in some specifications.  
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Overall, the findings in sections III and section IV provide a consistent picture. Cyclical 
as well as discretionary fiscal policy amplify output volatility (Tables 2 to 4), which is in turn 
negatively related to economic growth (Table 6). This also shows up in direct estimates of 
growth on cyclicality (Table 5). The effects found for rich countries are of the same order of 
magnitude but estimated less precisely, rendering the effects insignificant in some 
specifications with p-values slightly above the 10 percent level.  
 
 
V. Conclusions 
Previous studies found that discretionary fiscal policy, defined as policy unrelated to the 
business cycle, lowers output growth by increasing output volatility. Using a large cross-
section of 88 countries over the period 1960 to 2004, the present paper provides 
comprehensive empirical evidence that this is also true for the second important element of 
fiscal policy, i.e., cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
Building on Fatas and Mihov (2003), we suggest using information on the countries 
political and institutional characteristics to identify the causal effect of (endogenous) 
cyclicality on output volatility. In a second step, we consider the relation between economic 
growth and (endogenous) output volatility, induced by cyclical and discretionary fiscal policy.  
 
We estimate simple average measures of cyclicality of government consumption over 
the period 1960 to 2004 for each of the 88 countries of our sample. The choice of an 
expenditure-based measure is due to data availability on the one hand but also motivated by 
the fact that it is more indicative of intentional fiscal policy (and less driven by automatic 
stabilizers). We find that cyclical fiscal policy constitutes a non-negligible share of overall 
fiscal policy, accounting for roughly one fifth in the total variation of government 
consumption in our sample. We then demonstrate that institutional variables (such as political 
constraints on policy implementation and the average number of elections) contain 
considerable information about the cross-country variation of fiscal cyclicality.  
 
Using this exogenous variation, we identify a destabilizing effect of cyclical fiscal 
policy on economic activity, irrespective of whether the policy is pro- or countercyclical. This 
not only confirms the scepticisms against the usefulness of countercyclical fiscal policy as 
fine tuning instrument to smooth business cycles. It also implies that countercyclical policy 
has the same amplifying effect on volatility as procyclical fiscal policy; in fact, we find some 
support for the hypothesis that cyclical fiscal policy affects volatility much in the same way as 
pure fiscal shocks (i.e., discretionary fiscal policy, unrelated to the cycle).  Intentional cyclical 
policy measures – due to poor timing and lags in implementation and materialization (that 
will differ over alternative policy measures) – thus appear to spread over time in a way such 
that the implied average outcome is random with respect to (its effect on) the business cycle. 
According to this result, the way towards stabilization does not lead over more active 
countercyclical fiscal policy, but less cyclical fiscal policy at all. 
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The gains from this (passive) stabilization policy could be substantial in light of our 
finding that aggressive use of cyclical (as well as discretionary fiscal) policy has a negative 
effect on economic growth. This result is obtained both in a direct regression of growth on 
cyclicality and in a two stages least squares regression of growth on volatility, using the fiscal 
policy-related institutional variables as instrumental variables in the first stage regression. 
However, there is no evidence for a direct effect of cyclicality on economic growth, once 
output volatility is controlled for. These findings turn out robust across a large number of 
specifications and subsamples.   
 
Overall, our results have an important policy implication: Economic growth could be 
enhanced by introducing fiscal rules, designed to limit the use of discretionary fiscal policy on 
the one hand (as already argued by Fatas and Mihov, 2003) but also the use cyclical fiscal 
expenditure policy on the other hand.  
 
It should be added that – notwithstanding the robustness of our results with respect to 
subsample stability over the cross-country and time dimension – our cross-section estimates 
should be interpreted as averages over countries and time, not as economic laws that apply to 
every government at any time. Moreover, the use of government consumption as measure of 
fiscal policy– a choice required to obtain a relatively large sample of countries – limits the 
generality of the results. As a consequence, it would be interesting to investigate the effect of 
fiscal policy on volatility and growth for smaller groups of countries or single countries with 
more comprehensive, more detailed and higher frequency data on fiscal policy. Another 
question that remains to be addressed in future research is how existing fiscal rules affect the 
cyclical responsiveness of governments. Additional evidence on these issues would not only 
deepen our understanding of the channels, through which fiscal policy affects economic 
growth, but also help to answer the open question, how fiscal rules should be optimally 
designed in order to improve economic performance.  
 23 
References 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., and Thaicharoen, Y. (2003). Institutional causes, 
macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50, 49-123. 
Aghion, P., Angeletos, M., Banerjee, A., and Manova, K. (2005). Volatility and growth: credit 
constraints and productivity-enhancing investment. NBER Working Paper, No 11349. 
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (2006). Appropriate growth policy: a unifying framework. Journal 
of the European Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual 
Congress of the European Economic Association 4(2-3), 269-314. 
Aghion, P. and Marinescu, I. (2008). Cyclical budgetary policy and economic growth: what 
do we learn from OECD panel data? NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, forthcoming.  
Alcalá, F. and Ciccone, A. (2004). Trade and Productivity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
119(2), 613-646. 
Barro, R. J., and Lee, J.-W. (2002). International data on educational attainment: updates and 
implications. NBER Working Paper, No. 7911. 
Barlevy, G. (2004). The costs of business cycles under endogenous growth. American 
Economic Review, 94(4), 964-990. 
Caballero, R. and Hammour, M. (1991). The cleansing effect of recessions. American 
Economic Review, 84(5), 1350–1368. 
Caballero, R.J. (2008). A comment on Aghion-Marinescu‟s “cyclical budgetary policy and 
economic growth: what do we learn from OECD panel data?” NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, forthcoming. 
Easterly, W. (2005). National policies and economic growth: a reappraisal. In: Aghion, P. and 
Durlauf, S. (eds.). Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, part 1, 1015-1059. 
Fatas, A. and Mihov, I. (2003). The case for restricting fiscal policy discretion. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 4, 1419-1448.  
Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Chicago University Press.  
Frankel, J.A. and Romer, D. (1999). Does trade cause growth? American Economic Review, 
89(3), 279-399. 
Gali, J. (1994). Government size and macroeconomic stability. European Economic Review, 
38, 748-756. 
Gali, J. and Perotti, R. (2003). Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe. Economic 
Policy, 37, 533-572. 
 24 
Hall, R.E. (1991). Recessions as reorganizations. NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1991, 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Hall, R.E. and Jones, C.I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per 
worker than others? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83-116. 
Henisz, W.J. (2000). The institutional environment for economic growth. Economics and 
Politics, 12(1),  1-31.   
Lane, P.R. (2003). The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: evidence from the OECD. Journal 
of Public Economics, 87, 2661– 2675. 
Lucas, R.E. (1987). Models of Business Cycles. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.  
Mayer, T. and Zignago, S. (2006). Notes on CEPII‟s distances measures. CEPII, Paris. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT 
Press: Cambridge MA. 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2001). Political institutions and policy outcomes: what are the 
stylized facts? CEPR Discussion Paper 2872. 
Ramey, G. and Ramey, V. (1995). Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and 
growth. American Economic Review, 85(3), 1138-1151. 
Rodrick, D. (1998). Why do more open economies have bigger governments? Journal of 
Political Economy, 106, 997-1032. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1993). Endogenous growth and cycles. NBER Working Paper, No. 4286. 
Talvi, E. and Vegh, C. (2005). Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing 
countries. Journal of Development Economics, 78(1), 156-190, 
Temple, J. (2003). The long-run implications of growth theories. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 17(3) 497-510. 
Tornell, A. and Lane, P.R. (1999). The voracity effect. American Economic Review, 89, 22–
46. 
 
 
 
 
 25 
Appendix  
 
A1. Sample Description 
The largest set of countries for which the required key variables are available comprises 88 
countries. The list of countries is reported in Table A1, along with our estimates of the 
cyclicality parameter  and the aggressiveness of discretionary fiscal policy (DISCR) from 
equation (1).  
 
Table A1. Sample and Data on Output Volatility, Cyclical and Discretionary Fiscal Policy  
    ln y Cyclicality ( ˆ ) DISCR 
country                 time period (obs) 1960-2004 1980-2004 1960-2004 1980-2004 1960-2004 1980-2004 
Argentina 1960-2004 (45) 5.753 6.378 1.540 2.190 29.741 37.765 
Australia 1960-2004 (45) 1.840 1.807 -0.375 0.009 3.086 1.965 
Austria 1960-2004 (45) 1.777 1.162 0.264 0.493 2.035 1.602 
Burundi 1960-2004 (45) 5.798 4.399 1.070 0.875 16.535 17.037 
Belgium 1960-2004 (45) 1.833 1.333 -0.080 -0.031 2.396 1.841 
Benin 1960-2004 (45) 3.099 3.058 -0.034 0.038 8.456 9.478 
Burkina Faso 1960-2004 (45) 3.101 3.338 0.740 1.211 13.896 11.118 
Bangladesh 1960-2004 (45) 4.133 1.473 2.698 1.834 12.215 7.613 
Bolivia 1970-2004 (35) 3.616 2.650 2.049 2.394 9.886 9.686 
Brazil 1960-2004 (45) 3.877 3.453 0.480 0.596 8.490 9.000 
Centr. Afr. Rep. 1960-2002 (43) 4.034 4.678 0.891 1.095 11.129 12.311 
Canada 1965-2004 (40) 1.982 2.122 -0.464 -0.283 1.871 1.767 
Switzerland 1960-2004 (45) 2.247 1.572 0.440 0.446 2.065 1.873 
Chile 1960-2004 (45) 4.879 4.565 0.824 0.428 8.088 5.652 
Cote d'Ivoire 1960-2004 (45) 5.214 4.104 1.270 1.059 9.886 10.647 
Cameroon 1965-2004 (40) 5.818 5.306 0.988 1.004 8.558 10.020 
Congo, Rep. 1960-2004 (45) 5.500 6.002 0.461 0.448 17.857 22.703 
Colombia 1960-2004 (45) 2.084 2.095 0.686 0.693 9.275 9.074 
Costa Rica 1960-2004 (45) 3.241 3.585 1.016 1.177 5.458 6.202 
Germany 1960-2004 (45) 1.880 1.441 0.135 0.414 2.443 1.525 
Denmark 1960-2004 (45) 2.151 1.624 0.215 -0.342 2.526 1.804 
Dom. Republic 1960-2004 (45) 5.080 3.624 0.728 3.369 21.349 19.347 
Algeria 1960-2004 (45) 7.147 2.591 0.931 0.551 9.207 7.538 
Ecuador 1960-2004 (45) 3.448 3.162 1.365 0.826 11.162 10.418 
Egypt 1960-2004 (45) 2.726 1.758 0.662 -0.202 9.407 6.722 
Spain 1960-2004 (45) 2.326 1.574 0.656 0.430 2.659 2.223 
Finland 1960-2004 (45) 2.838 2.859 -0.054 -0.074 2.958 2.857 
Fiji 1960-2000 (41) 4.616 4.594 0.628 0.441 7.567 8.167 
France 1960-2004 (45) 1.585 1.138 -0.281 -0.432 1.411 1.186 
Gabon 1960-2000 (41) 9.397 5.968 0.616 0.683 20.247 17.257 
United Kingdom 1960-2004 (45) 1.735 1.754 -0.262 -0.273 2.320 1.914 
Ghana 1960-2004 (45) 4.592 3.603 1.776 3.716 14.358 14.671 
Greece 1960-2004 (45) 3.736 2.321 0.437 0.771 5.451 5.355 
Guatemala 1960-2004 (45) 2.458 2.178 1.121 2.170 8.607 9.144 
Honduras 1960-2004 (45) 2.886 2.423 -0.110 0.596 7.057 7.434 
Haiti 1967-2003 (37) 4.469 4.146 1.146 1.134 10.656 10.947 
Indonesia 1960-2004 (45) 3.981 4.444 1.560 1.453 14.998 8.224 
India 1960-2004 (45) 3.038 1.817 0.518 0.340 5.047 3.237 
Ireland 1960-2004 (45) 2.595 2.930 0.602 0.610 3.561 3.373 
Iceland 1960-2004 (45) 3.701 2.914 0.860 0.669 3.904 3.244 
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Table A1 (continued). Sample and Data on Output Volatility, Cyclical and Discretionary 
Fiscal Policy 
    ln y in percent Cyclicality ( ˆ ) DISCR in percent 
country                  time period (obs) 1960-2004 1980-2004 1960-2004 1980-2004 1960-2004 1980-2004 
Israel 1960-2004 (45) 3.331 2.118 1.181 1.334 9.928 6.283 
Italy 1960-2004 (45) 2.148 1.275 0.059 0.293 2.848 2.578 
Jamaica 1966-2004 (39) 4.596 3.167 1.150 1.427 9.612 10.284 
Japan 1960-2004 (45) 3.453 1.791 0.128 0.123 2.205 0.879 
Kenya 1960-2004 (45) 4.562 1.982 1.202 1.789 5.977 4.584 
Korea, Rep. 1960-2004 (45) 3.441 3.782 -0.281 -0.121 6.844 3.137 
Sri Lanka 1960-2004 (45) 1.901 1.722 0.319 1.089 8.646 9.695 
Lesotho 1960-2004 (45) 6.383 3.844 0.239 -0.350 15.132 9.970 
Morocco 1960-2004 (45) 4.449 4.796 0.700 0.549 7.568 4.719 
Madagascar 1960-2004 (45) 4.266 4.782 1.240 1.220 9.628 10.979 
Mexico 1960-2004 (45) 3.312 3.619 1.660 1.760 5.305 5.752 
Mali 1967-2004 (38) 5.140 5.154 0.660 1.296 16.133 15.721 
Mauritania 1960-2004 (45) 5.890 3.270 0.635 1.900 17.809 18.398 
Mauritius 1980-2004 (25) 1.535 1.535 0.583 0.583 3.751 3.751 
Malawi 1960-2004 (45) 5.423 5.721 -0.835 -2.066 15.870 16.817 
Malaysia 1960-2004 (45) 3.385 3.971 0.229 0.548 8.451 8.308 
Niger 1960-2004 (45) 6.253 5.542 0.762 1.270 11.605 11.165 
Nigeria 1960-2004 (45) 7.186 5.100 0.429 0.814 19.854 22.460 
Nicaragua 1960-2004 (45) 6.895 4.200 0.277 1.633 19.112 22.562 
Netherlands 1960-2004 (45) 1.833 1.503 0.350 -0.027 2.177 1.770 
Norway 1960-2004 (45) 1.554 1.618 0.631 0.023 3.675 3.982 
New Zealand 1971-2004 (34) 2.835 1.946 0.360 0.159 4.133 2.658 
Pakistan 1960-2004 (45) 2.187 1.793 0.975 1.308 8.104 7.276 
Panama 1960-2004 (45) 4.197 4.832 1.168 1.044 6.571 6.125 
Peru 1960-2004 (45) 5.038 6.201 1.248 1.381 9.718 7.948 
Philippines 1960-2004 (45) 3.027 3.629 1.261 1.490 5.344 5.665 
Pap. New Guinea 1961-1999 (39) 4.610 5.118 1.042 0.893 8.776 9.588 
Portugal 1960-2004 (45) 3.295 2.521 0.750 1.261 3.549 2.571 
Paraguay 1960-2004 (45) 3.793 3.768 0.469 0.988 9.713 10.104 
Rwanda 1960-2004 (45) 11.997 14.623 1.171 1.303 16.300 16.653 
Senegal 1960-2004 (45) 4.173 3.777 0.827 0.033 18.002 5.998 
Singapore 1960-2004 (45) 4.175 3.832 0.043 -0.339 6.823 7.359 
El Salvador 1960-2004 (45) 3.834 4.215 0.561 0.319 5.802 5.548 
Sweden 1960-2004 (45) 1.925 1.837 0.032 0.050 2.252 1.828 
Syr. Arab Rep. 1960-2004 (45) 7.809 5.298 0.569 -0.005 9.749 9.548 
Chad 1960-2004 (45) 8.186 8.773 0.064 0.027 14.689 19.314 
Togo 1960-2004 (45) 6.131 6.234 0.174 0.410 17.114 13.173 
Thailand 1960-2004 (45) 3.635 4.436 0.519 0.446 4.761 3.667 
Trin. and Tobago 1960-2004 (45) 4.749 5.666 1.195 1.269 11.929 13.900 
Tunisia 1961-2004 (44) 3.343 2.557 0.443 -0.019 5.614 2.266 
Turkey 1968-2004 (37) 4.147 4.637 0.629 0.602 7.737 8.357 
Uruguay 1960-2004 (45) 4.744 5.812 0.989 0.974 10.328 5.996 
United States 1960-2004 (45) 1.906 1.820 -0.048 -0.091 1.967 1.310 
Venezuela 1960-2004 (45) 4.949 5.938 1.616 1.913 16.543 20.776 
South Africa 1960-2004 (45) 2.525 2.658 0.892 0.664 4.724 3.700 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960-2004 (45) 6.079 5.363 1.570 1.425 26.618 32.791 
Zambia 1960-2004 (45) 4.703 3.919 1.485 1.928 21.520 24.135 
Zimbabwe 1960-2004 (45) 5.828 5.811 0.335 0.339 12.693 15.324 
Correlation  0.842 0.766 0.935 
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A2. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
DEP dependency ratio, defined as ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 to 
working age population (people from 15 to 64). Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI). 
GC real general government consumption in national currency. Source: WDI. 
GDPPC real GDP per capita in PPP$. Source: Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.2. 
GDPPW real GDP per worker in PPP$. Source: PWT 6.2. 
GSIZE ratio of government consumption to GDP. 
HC
prim 
primary educational attainment, defined as fraction of males above 25 with 
primary schooling. Source: Barro and Lee (2002).  
HC
sec
 secondary educational attainment, defined as fraction of males above 25 with 
secondary schooling. Source: Barro and Lee (2002). 
MAJ zero-one dummy for electoral system (1 for majoritarian, 0 for proportional). 
Sources: Person and Tabellini (2001), Database of Political Institutions. 
NELEC average number of elections. Sources: Database of Political Institutions. 
OPEN ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. Source: PWT 6.2. 
POLCON  index of political constraints. Source: Henisz (2000). 
POP population in million persons. Source: WDI. 
PRES zero-one dummy for political regime (1 for presidential, 0 for parliamentary). 
Source: Person and Tabellini (2001), Database of Political Institutions. 
URB ratio of urban population to total population. Source: WDI. 
y real GDP in national currency per capita; y = Y/POP. Source: WDI. 
Y real GDP in national currency. Source: WDI. 
Data source for the geographical variables (such as bilateral distance, area, common border 
dummies) is the CEPII database (see Mayer and Zignago, 2006).    
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A3. Construction of Instrument for Output Volatility 
The instrument for output volatility Z

 takes the following value for country i:  
 
 yj
N
ijj
iji wZ 
 ˆlnˆ
,1


 , 
 
where yjˆ is the „institutionally induced‟ output volatility of country j, obtained by forming 
predicted values from a cross-country regression of yln on a constant and the four 
institutional variables NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, and PRES.  
 
The weights ijwˆ  are obtained as predicted values of the bilateral trade shares (imports 
plus exports as a share of GDP) from a gravity model including geographical variables only.
16
 
In line with Frankel and Romer (1999) the following explanatory variables are included in the 
geographical gravity model: the size of countries i and j (measured by area and population), 
distance between countries i and j, a common border dummy, a landlocked dummy, as well as 
interaction terms of all variables with the common border dummy. The gravity model is 
estimated for our sample of 7656 bilateral trade flows (on which 6393 nonzero observations 
are available), using average values from the period 1980 to 1990 (roughly corresponding to 
our sample midpoint). 
 
Both models, the regression of volatility on the four institutional variables and the 
geographical gravity model, perform reasonably well with an R
2
 (F-statistic) of 0.493 (20.191) 
and 0.347 (261.051) respectively. The correlation between Z

 and the trade share weighted 
volatility based on actual rather than predicted values is 0.602. Finally, the correlation 
between Z

  and output volatility is 0.336.  
                                                 
16
 This approach is inspired by Frankel and Romer (1999), who use the country-specific sum of 
predicted bilateral trade shares from a geographical gravity model – an aggregate measure of 
proximity – as an instrument in a cross-country regression of per capita income on (endogenous) 
trade and country size. The difference is that we use the bilateral predicted values as weights rather 
than summing them up to an aggregate proximity measure.   
Table 1. Political Determinants of Cyclicality and First Stage Regressions 
Dependent 
variable is: 
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
ln CYC ln CYC ln CYC ln CYC ln CYC ln CYC ln CYC ln Discr 
NELEC -2.674
***
    -2.566
**
 -2.391
***
 -2.305
***
 -0.513 
 (0.774)    (1.000) (0.660) (0.767) (0.355) 
POLCON  -1.905
***
   -1.704
***
 -1.822
***
 -1.489
**
 -0.470
**
 
  (0.334)   (0.569) (0.313) (0.658) (0.236) 
MAJ   0.007  -0.036   -0.139
**
 
   (0.233)  (0.197)   (0.068) 
PRES    0.460
*
 0.112   0.408
***
 
    (0.242) (0.415)   (0.143) 
ln POP       -0.196
***
 -0.082
**
 
       (0.064) (0.024) 
URBAN       -0.800 0.004 
       (0.753) (0.259) 
DEP       3.003
*
 0.477 
       (1.549) (0.568) 
OPEN       -0.577
**
 0.091 
       (0.299) (0.102) 
ln GDPPC       0.609
*
 -0.283
**
 
       (0.359) (0.122) 
         
F-stat.
1)
 11.934
***
 32.589
***
 0.001 3.594
*
 12.312
***
 25.142
***
 6.587
**
 6.289
***
 
F-stat.
2)
       8.472
***
 8.663
***
 
R
2
 
0.122 
(0.007) 
0.275 
(0.146) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
0.040 
(0.018) 
0.372 
(0.091) 
0.372 
(0.089) 
0.502 
(0.13) 
0.872 
(0.674) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Notes: A constant is included in all models. 
*, **, ***
 denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level 
respectively; standard errors in parenthesis. Table reports weighted least squares estimates, using the 
inverse of the variance of CYC as weight. R
2
 refers to weighted model. 
1)
 F-test on excluding the 
institutional variables (NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES) from first stage regression for ln CYC and  
ln Discr. 2) F-Test on excluding all instruments (institutional variables, ln POP, URBAN, DEP) from 
regression.  
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Table 2. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy and Output Volatility – Basic Model 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
 WLS WTSLS WLS WTSLS LS TSLS WTSLS WTSLS 
lnCYC  0.184** 0.595** 0.239*** 0.600*** 0.150*** 0.742***   
 (0.082) (0.232) (0.060) (0.207) (0.044) (0.185)   
D
counter
 ln CYC 0.094 -0.094       
 (0.083) (0.208)       
CYC       1.432
***
 1.762
***
 
       (0.311) (0.332) 
D
counter
 CYC       -0.528  
       (0.517)  
Hausman 
1)
 (p-val.)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OID 
2)
 (p-val.)  (0.128)  (0.236)  (0.227) (0.036) (0.887) 
R
2
 0.128 0.096 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.105 0.099 
SEE 0.448 0.606 0.454 0.626 0.431 0.731 0.768 0.915 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln y. A constant is included in all models. *, **, *** denote significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively; robust standard errors in parenthesis. WLS denotes weighted 
least squares estimates, using the inverse of the variance of CYC as weight. (W)TSLS denotes 
(weighted) two stages least squares, using NELEC and POLCON as instruments for CYC. R
2
 refers to 
unweighted model, calculated as squared correlation between actual and predicted values. 
1)
 
Heteroskedasticity-robust test for exogeneity; H0: CYC is exogenous. 
2)
 Heteroskedasticity-robust test 
of overidentifying restrictions; H0: NELEC, POLCON are valid instruments.  
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Table 3. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy and Output Volatility – Extended Model  
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4) 
 LS TSLS WTSLS TSLS WTSLS WTSLS LIML WTSLS 
ln CYC 0.079
*
 0.676
**
 0.292
**
 0.318
*
 0.324
*
 0.163
*
 0.182
**
 0.238
***
 
 (0.040) (0.270) (0.119) (0.166) (0.188) (0.090) (0.083) (0.068) 
D
counter
 ln CYC    -0.067 -0.084    
    (0.133) (0.153)    
ln DISCR      0.454 0.417
**
 restricted 
      (0.276) (0.204)  
GSIZE -0.045 1.840 -3.406 0.635 -6.354 -2.709 -1.299 -3.431 
 (0.620) (4.894) (3.903) (0.260) (4.654) (2.854) (0.994) (2.724) 
OPEN 0.176
**
 0.447
*
 -0.003 0.293
*
 0.077 -0.118 -0.108 -0.061 
 (0.080) (0.257) (0.194) (0.166) (0.196) (0.129) (0.109) (0.158) 
ln GDPPC -0.239
***
 -0.096 -0.206 -0.189
***
 -0.166 -0.004 -0.013 -0.088 
 (0.041) (0.125) (0.127) (0.071) (0.158) (0.107) (0.099) (0.114) 
Hausman 
1)
 (p-val.)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.179) (0.000) (0.016)  (0.000) 
OID 
2)
 (p-val.)  (0.893) (0.683) (0.057) (0.554) (0.817)  (0.913) 
R
2
 0.404 0.159 0.279 0.292 0.220 0.479 0.534 0.376 
SEE 0.358 0.658 0.507 0.418 0.583 0.469 0472 0.485 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln y. A constant is included in all models. *, **, *** denote significance at 
10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively; robust standard errors in parenthesis. WLS denotes weighted 
least squares estimates, using the inverse of the variance of CYC as weight. (W)TSLS denotes 
(weighted) two stages least squares, using NELEC and POLCON as instruments for CYC and using 
NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, and PRES as instruments for CYC and DISCR in columns (3) and (4). 
1)
 
Heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test for exogeneity; H0: ln CYC, GSIZE (and ln DISCR) are 
exogenous. 
2)
 Heteroskedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions; H0: NELEC, POLCON 
(MAJ, PRES ) and ln POP, DEP, URBAN are valid instruments. 
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Table 4. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy and Output Volatility – Robustness  
 1960-2004  1980-2004 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)  (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) 
 level of CYC exl. large volatility exl. large CYC Rich 
 
 Level  of CYC  
equ. (2b) equ. (2a) equ. (2b) equ. (3) equ. (2a) equ. (3) equ. (2a) equ. (3) equ. (2b) equ. (2a) equ. (3) equ. (3) 
 WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS  WTSLS WTSLS WTSLS LIML 
lnCYC    0.130 0.071* 0.282** 0.129** 0.131 0.063  0.231***  0.078 0.273* 
   (0.087) (0.042) (0.116) (0.059) (0.110) (0.047)  (0.066)  (0.056) (0.153) 
D
counter
 ln CYC          -0.100
**
    
          (0.043)    
CYC 0.825
***
 1.034
**
         0.946
**
   
 (0.314) (0.317)         (0.459)   
D
counter
 CYC -0.026             
 (0.630)             
ln DISCR    0.505
**
  0.554
**
  0.488
**
    0.405
***
 0.408
**
 
    (0.170)  (0.212)  (0.235)    (0.072) (0.164) 
GSIZE -4.899 -4.988 -2.389 -2.345 -2.310 -2.199 -2.122 -2.547  -1.369 -4.708 -3.606
**
 -6.977
**
 
 (5.222) (4.202) (3.300) (2.164) (3.598) (0.283) (2.844) (1.936)  (1.782) (3.681) (1.676) (3.155) 
OPEN 0.037 0.023 0.0063 -0.076 -0.029 -0.157 -0.021 -0.116  -0.039 0.208 -0.089 0.092 
 (0.144) (0.149) (0.128) (0.088) (0.210) (0.116) (0.171) (0.110)  (0.137) (0.231) (0.072) (0.216) 
ln GDPPC -0.145 -0.095 -0.187
**
 0.063 -0.237
**
 0.025 -0.502
*
 -0.172  -0.388
***
 -0.164 -0.105 0.065 
 (0.150) (0.145) (0.093) (0.090) (0.114) (0.090) (0.277) (0.314)  (0.065) (0.194) (0.098) (0.186) 
Hausman (p-val.) (0.009) (0.000) (0.100) (0.218) (0.000) (0.028) (0.109) (0.187)  (0.000) (0.023) (0.138)  
OID (p-val.) (0.696) (0.949) (0.075) (0.122) (0.544) (0.609) (0.336) (0.247)  (0.206) (0.309) (0.200)  
R
2
 0.204 0.167 0.344 0.520 0.309 0.507 0.309 0.651  0.296 0.175 0.463 0.317 
SEE 0.642 0.713 0.335 0.366 0.479 0.433 0.399 0.342  0.654 1.008 0.643 0.673 
Observations 89 89 77 77 79 79 28 28  88 88 88 88 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln y. A constant is included in all models. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively; robust standard 
errors in parenthesis. See also Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table 5. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth  
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (3c) 
 LS TSLS WLS WTSLS LS TSLS WTSLS 
ln CYC -0.362
**
 -0.767
*
 -0.341
*
 -0.606
*
 -0.297
**
 -1.149
**
 -0.439
*
 
 (0.161) (0.441) (0.188) (0.344) (0.118) (0.514) (0.226) 
D
counter
 ln CYC 0.151 0.379 0.090 0.173    
 (0.157) (0.331) (0.152) (0.215)    
ln GDPPW
in
 -0.748
***
 -0.798
***
 -1.046
***
 -1.016
***
 -0.748
***
 -0.895
***
 -1.087
***
 
 (0.158) (0.166) (0.195) (0.120) (0.158) (0.191) (0.200) 
ln HC
prim
 0.524
**
 0.568
**
 1.134
***
 1.180
***
 0.532 0.688
**
 1.163
***
 
 (0.218) (0.244) (0.212) (0.236) (0.217) (0.318) (0.242) 
ln HC
sec
 0.724
***
 0.646
***
 0.716
***
 0.567
**
 0.726 0.515
**
 0.663
***
 
 (0.136) (0.185) (0.177) (0.279) (0.132) (0.223) (0.240) 
Hausman 
1)
 (p-val.)  (0.467)  (0.182)  (0.015) (0.418) 
OID 
2)
 (p-val.)  (0.028)  (0.335)  (0.929) (0.250) 
R
2
 0.400 0.363 0.370 0.358 0.395 0.268 0.365 
SEE 1.051 1.100 1.203 1.121 1.048 1.332 1.107 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDPPWln . A constant is included in all models. *, **, *** denote 
significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively; robust standard errors in parenthesis. WLS 
denotes weighted least squares estimates, using the inverse of the variance of CYC as weight. (W)TSLS 
denotes (weighted) two stages least squares, using NELEC and POLCON as instruments for CYC. 
1)
 
Heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test for exogeneity; H0: ln CYC is exogenous. 
2)
 Heteroskedasticity-
robust test of overidentifying restrictions; H0: NELEC, POLCON are valid instruments.  
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Table 6. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy, Output Volatility, and Economic Growth  
 (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2) (3a) (3b) (3c) (4) 
 LS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS LS TSLS WTSLS WTSLS 
ln y -0.994** -2.968*** -3.689* -2.993*** -2.174* -0.662** -2.101* -1.173* -1.416** 
 (0.302) (0.107) (2.128) (0.955) (1.196) (0.292) (1.187) (0.083) (0.611) 
ln CYC      -0.100 -0.071 -0.194 -0.309 
      (0.109) (0.158) (0.133) (0.232) 
D
counter
 ln CYC         0.182 
         (0.169) 
ln GDPPW
in
 -0.821
***
 -1.066
***
 -1.155
***
 -1.069
***
 -1.065
***
 -0.971
***
 -1.058
***
 -1.412
***
 -1.364
***
 
 (0.157) (0.223) (0.236) (0.213) (0.176) (0.198) (0.175) (0.249) (0.252) 
ln HC
prim
 0.551
**
 0.697
***
 0.750
***
 0.699
***
 -0.569
*
 0.401
***
 0.587
*
 1.090
***
 1.127
***
 
 (0.203) (0.230) (0.274) (0.225) (0.292) (0.146) (0.297) (0.0186) (0.190) 
ln HC
sec
 0.580
***
 0.144
**
 -0.015
**
 0.138 0.446 0.598
***
 0.341 0.671
***
 0.061
***
 
 (0.148) (0.305) (0.491) (0.270) (0.241) (0.001) (0.242) (0.149) (0.147) 
GADP     1.007 2.067 0.861 -0.314 -0.786 
     (1.562) (0.650) (1.642) (1.610) (1.463) 
Hausman 
1)
 (p-val.)  (0.023) (0.026) (0.011) (0.251)  (0.302) (0.187) (0.041) 
OID 
2)
 (p-val.)  (0.760) - (0.771) (0.644)  (0.607) (0.692) (0.673) 
R
2
 0.409 0.316 0.278 0.314 0.430 0.537 0.463 0.417 0.406 
SEE 1.036 1.222 1.363 1.227 1.053 0.935 0.484 1.138 1.172 
Observations 80 80 80 80 78 78 78 78 78 
Notes: Dependent variable is GDPPWln . A constant is included in all models. *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively; robust 
standard errors in parenthesis. WLS denotes weighted least squares estimates, using the inverse of the variance of CYC as weight. TSLS denotes (weighted) two 
stages least squares, using the following instruments for  y: NELEC, POLCON, MAJ, PRES in (1b), Z in (1c), and both the institutional variables and Z in all 
other columns. 
1)
 Heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test for exogeneity; H0: ln CYC, GSIZE (and ln DISCR) are exogenous. 
2)
 
)
 Heteroskedasticity-robust test of 
overidentifying restrictions; H0: NELEC, POLCON (MAJ, PRES ) and ln POP, DEP, URBAN. 
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Figure1. Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy and Output Volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationships between Key Variables in Empirical Models  
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